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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STEPHANIE BOSTON,
Petitioner/Appellant,
v.
SALT LAKE CITY
CORPORATION AND SALT
LAKE CITY CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION,

Court of Appeals No: 20080086
(Oral Argument Requested)

Respondents/Appellees.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

Through counsel, and pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(c), petitionerappellant Stephanie Boston submits this reply brief. This brief responds to
the arguments of respondent-appellee Salt Lake City in its brief of appellee.
REPLY TO THE CITY'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
The City has fired Officer Boston, whose "evaluations were
universally excellent" (R. 33), for five asserted errors committed during a
ten-year career. On appeal, the City accuses Officer Boston of failing to
"marshal the facts" in support of the Commission's decision to uphold that

termination. (Br. of Appellee pp. 4 & n.2, 17-21, 26, 27, 36, 38, 40.) That
accusation will be answered in Reply Point I of this brief.
For now, it suffices to observe that at least with respect to the events
that led to Officer Boston's termination, there is no disagreement. The
parties agree that Officer Boston had been disciplined for three policy
violations committed in early 2005. (Br. of Appellant p. 6-7; Br. of
Appellee p. 5-8.) The parties agree that with respect to the October 2006
collision incident, the reporting witness was not called, field sobriety tests
were not done, and the suspect was cited for an incorrect offense under the
City Code. (Br. of Appellant p. 8-10; Br. of Appellee p. 8-10.) The parties
agree that with respect to the February 2007 theft incident, Boston did not
contact the suspect during her response to the complainant's call, and she
wrote a "log report" instead of a "general offense report" to document her
response. (Br. of Appellant p. 10-11; Br. of Appellee p. 10.)
The parties disagree over the reasoning given by Officer Boston for
handling the collision and theft incidents as she did. In part, the legitimacy
of such reasoning turns upon a significant evidentiary conflict, regarding the
collision incident, that was never resolved by the Commission. (Br. of
Appellant pp. 9, 17.) There is no material fact conflict regarding the theft
incident.
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Fundamentally, the parties disagree as to whether Officer Boston's
conduct, with respect to those incidents, measured up to Department
expectations. The parties also disagree regarding the consequence imposed
for Officer Boston's handling of those incidents, including the process by
which that consequence was imposed. Such disagreements are not factual.
Rather, such disagreements go to the legal conclusions reached by the
Commission.

REPLY ARGUMENT
REPLY POINT I:
IMPROPER EVIDENCE IS NOT MARSHALED EVIDENCE
The City repeatedly accuses Officer Boston of ignoring Utah's
"evidence marshaling" requirement on appeal. (Br. of Appellee pp. 20-21,
22, 24, 26, 27, 28, 36, 38, 40.) That accusation is inaccurate. As just
explained, the basic underlying facts are undisputed: Boston was fired for
five asserted errors committed during ten years of service. The City, not
Boston, misinterprets and misuses the "marshaling" requirement.
A. Repetition and Misstatement is Not "Marshaling."
Much of what the City proffers as "marshaled" evidence is really
"multiplied" evidence. In the collision incident, the suspect driver is
repetitively described as "possibly intoxicated" and as showing "indications"
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of intoxication; also, there was "some conversation" about "whether he was
intoxicated." (Br. of Appellee p. 22 ^ a, b, d.) The City thereby multiplies
one piece of evidence into three. Similarly, Officer Boston's training and
experience in DUI investigation is multiplied into four pieces of evidence.
(Id. p. 23 ffl[ m, n, o, p.) 1
Other "evidence" marshaled by the City really amounts to opinions, or
to conclusions', these too, are repeated. For example, the City avers that the
collision investigation was "incomplete," and the "situation warranted a
further investigation" (id. p. 22 «|]f f, g). Indulging in duplicative opinions
and conclusions, the City avers that Officer Boston "failed to perform the
basic fundamental duties" required in the collision incident; she also "failed
to properly handle the call" (id. p. 23 | f k, 1).
The City's description of the theft incident, in which Boston allegedly
violated a report-writing policy, contains inaccuracies. The City recites that
in 2005, Boston had been disciplined for a similar failure to write a "general
offense report." (Br. of Appellee p. 26 \ a.) However, that 2005 discipline
(80-hour suspension) had also been based upon Boston's failure, in the same
incident, to handle evidence in compliance with a different Department

however, the City declines to acknowledge the discrepancy between Officer
Boston's and Officer Stutz's descriptions of the suspect driver. Stutz's description
was adopted by Chief Burbank. (See Br. of Appellant p. 17.)
4

policy. (SLC 370.) It is an overstatement, therefore, to assert that Boston's
alleged "report writing" violation, in 2007, is of a piece with the 2005
\ lolalii ii -if twu full. u;\
Also, the City inaccurately alleges that the Department's "i ep<it:t"
policy "specifically states" that for certain situations "a general offense
report is required " (Br of Appellee p. 2 6 1 b, citing Burbank testimony at
K ili( :> DA 3 0 1 00 00 (R 3. ir Bi < >:! \\ >j >ellai it
Appendix 1), contains no such specificity. It is entitled "Situations
Requiring a Report," without the descriptor "general offense." The policy's
text specifically requires a "General Offense report" only for certain "use of
f •*••• ""

test

Whether a "log report" would qualify as a "report" under Department
policy was, at the time of Boston's Commission hearing, an issue that was
unresolved. Other officers used "log reports" in situations wherein a
"general offense i epoi t" vv oi ild be preferred

(Bi of \ppellai it p 19 20.

citing Burbank testimony at R. 31 p. 124-125 and Hill testimony at R. 31 pp
169-172, 209-215.) Thus rather than "marshaling evidence," the City is
placing its own gloss, poorly supported by text and actual practice, on the

5

B. Irrelevant Evidence is Not Marshaled Evidence.
Under the guise of marshaling the evidence, the City invites this Court
to consider matters that are irrelevant at best, and are also unfairly
prejudicial. This Court should decline that invitation.
In one instance, the City recites a rejected allegation of
"untruthfulness" thai had been connected with one of the 2005 policy
violations. (Br. of Appellee p. 8; compare SLC 371 ("The allegation of
untruthfulness is not determined").) Neither Chief Burbank's termination
letter nor the Commission's decision found "untruthfulness" by Officer
Boston. (R. 1-5, in Br. of Appellant Appendix 1; R. 32-35, in Br. of
Appellant Appendix 2.) The witness who described the 2005
"untruthfulness" allegation understood that evidence that might have
supported it had been obtained in violation of Department protocol. (R. 31
p. 61-62.) It appears highly improper for the City to resurrect an
"untruthfulness" charge that could only have been supported by the fruit of
the Department's own policy violation. And because that charge was
rejected, the City's effort to insinuate it into this appeal should be rejected,
as an improper effort to re-litigate a matter that has already been decided.
In another instance, the City inaccurately recites that the "charges"
against Officer Boston, leading to her termination, included

6

"insubordination." (Br. of Appellee p. 29.) Again, no such "charge" is
referenced either in Chief Burbank's termination letter or in the
1

'oinmiNsioif s decision

ht

I nsuhni'di nation" means'

State of being insubordinate; disobedience to constituted
authority. Refusal to obey some order which a superior officer
is entitled to give and have obeyed, Term imports a w ilful [sic]
or intentional disregard of tl ic lawful a.i id reasonable
expectations of the employer.
Bhwk \ I iiw l)ft'tit)thir\. Abinl(t»ol l;illlt I1*) ' l*'S H
'I

I In; lenn plainly

bespeaks willful and intentional disobedience. Officer Boston was neithei
accused of nor found to have committed insubordination, i • H he contrary,
;ic i ommission found that "Boston did 11.>; \• • • * *
•

•

:

- •

•IV

i-1

solate Department
* '"

Hi Ci*

'•"• '" ( ) f

"insubordination," raised on appeal, should be rejected as a distortion of the
record.
Finally, the City repeatedly recites that Officer Boston did not appeal
tl ic disciplii le that was n leted o\ it I bi 1 ler 2005 polic> v iolations. (Bi • : f
Appellee pp. 5, 7, 8.) It offered similar commentary during Boston's
Commission hearing. (R. 31 pp. 47, 65, 90. 303-304.) One commissioner,
fc How if ig tl le City's lead, interrogated Boston about why she had not

Similarly, a general dictionary defines "insubordinate" as "not submitting to
authority; disobedient," with synonyms of "refractory, defiant, insolent."
Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary (Random House 1996), p. 989.
7

appealed the 2005 discipline. (R. 31 p. 311-312.) The fact of the prior
discipline is a legitimate part of this Court's review. But Officer Boston's
decision to accept that discipline without appealing it—"I took the high road
and I took my lumps . . . " (R. 31 p. 311)—does not magnify the propriety of
that discipline. It is frankly baffling to suggest that Officer Boston's
decision to waive her appeal right, in 2005, has any place in the review of
Chief Burbank's 2007 termination decision. The City's reliance upon that
irrelevant fact—apparently persuasive to at least one commissioner—was
improper before the Commission, and it is improper before this Court.
The City's reference to such matters amounts to the interjection of
irrelevant, untrue, and unfairly prejudicial character attacks into this appeal.
Under Utah R. App,. P. 24(k), which prohibits inclusion of "scandalous"
matters in appellate briefs, such references arguably should be stricken.
Most certainly, they ought not be considered as properly-marshaled,
supporting evidence. See State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297 (Utah 1986)
("derogatory references" in brief are "of no assistance" in resolving appeal).
To the contrary, such references can be interpreted as betraying awareness
that the actual evidence, supporting Boston's termination, is insubstantial.

8

C. Inapplicability of Marshaling to Public Employment Appeals.
The I'll.) ""s invocation of the "evidence marshaling" requirement, in
tt lis case, is acti ialb ' di ibioi is as a n latter of la sv and appellate policy I Ji ider
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9), the requirement applies to "fact iinaniLj.

*t

does not, and ought not, apply to the mixture of opinions and desired
1:011 elusions offered by the ( ii> m thi> appeal.
r

1 1 le City cites 1 10 < •

- *

e reqi liren iei it has been applied to

appeals from a decision to terminate public employment.

Officer Bostoi1

has located a single reference to evidence marshaling in this context,
Huemiller v. Ogden City Civil Service Comm yn, 2004 I IT App 375 | 6, 101
I1 ^1 394, 397

ITial oflhninl •s^vniiny reference was not supported by

citation to an employment termination case, but to a workers' compensation
case, Whitearv. Labor Comm 'n, 9 7 3 ? ?d 0S~ f T i ^ C\ \ p p 1998).
Regarding public employment termination, this Court has expressed its
determination to review an. et t lployee's entit e ' 1 li story

K e}lly v Salt L t ike

The cases cited by the City are not public employment cases, and most of them
involve challenges to trial court findings, rather than agency findings. See Moon
v. Moon, 1999 UT App. 12, 973 P.2d 431 (divorce/alimony case before trial
court); Scharfv. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985) (dispute over equipment
lease, trial court findings); Gray v. Oxford Worldwide Group, Inc., 2006 UT App
241, 139 P.3d 267 (landlord-tenant case, trial court findings); Whitear v. Labor
Comm % 973 P.2d 982 (Utah Ct \pp. 1998) (review of administrative law judge
workers' compensation decision, citing "substantial evidence" and "evidence
marshaling" standards); Hurley v. Bd. of Rev. of Indus. Comm % 767 P.2d 524
(Utah 1988) (review of industrial commission decision under "substantial
evidence" standard).
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Civil Service Comm % 2000 UT App 235 % 7, 8 P.3d 1048, 1051 (cited and
quoted in Br. of Appellant p. 5).
That determination is appropriate in light of law establishing that
public employment is protected under constitutional due process principles.
A decision whether such employment has been terminated in violation of
such principles will be made without appellate deference to the tribunal
whose decision is under appeal. See Harmon v. Ogden City Civil Service
Comm % 2007 UT App 336fflf7, 14, 171 P.3d 474, 477, 479 (citing
authority). Furthermore, while factual findings normally receive high
deference on appeal, the Utah Supreme Court has stated: "In some cases,
however, less deference is given to factual determinations. For example, a
court may exercise greater scrutiny when constitutional rights are at stake."
Hurley v. Bd. of Review of Indus. Comm Yz, 767 P.2d 524, 527 n.3 (Utah
1988).
The City, therefore, is mistaken in its assertion that Officer Boston
would have this Court, on appeal, "ignore the totality of her misconduct
[and] focus solely on the positive aspects of her career ...." (Br. of
Appellee p. 28.) Officer Boston asks this Court to consider all of the
relevant evidence related to her employment and to the Department's
decision to terminate that employment. That request is in accord with the
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law See also Lucas v. Murray City Civil Sewice Comm 'n, 949 P.2d 746
(Utah * * App. 1997) (reciting police officer's positive history along with
Ihr iillo-afioth o f m i s o n u l i h l I ll is (lie < il\ I hat misses the mark, by

focusing solely upon instances oi nc<iatn<

a*

\ \:^;

\ i

distorting the nature of that conduct.
REPLY POINT II:
I

-

!>EINCE INSUBSTANTIAL

As explained in Reply Point I, much nl llr (ril\ \ "lads" a MI
"evidence" are actually opinions or conclusions advocated by the City.
Nevertheless, UK K -;. insists that the Commission's "findings" are all
si lppoi t : d by "si ibstai ltial evidei ice." (Bi 3, vppellee p . i •.' i I * • he
extent that such "findings" are actually opirih
of discretion" or "reasonableness and rationality" standard applies. (Br. of
Appellant p. J.)
Neither sijunliinl culaiIs <J<n, iIc acquiescence to the Department's and
the Commission's decisions. Nor is such aaiu'cscauv appiopnaU" in lii'lil
of the serious procedural flaws that underpin this termination decision. This
Cotirt's application of the "substantial evidence" standard, in Lucas v.
Murray City Civil Ser vice Comm IT 949 I > 2d ' ) ' 44 ' 758 - 761 (1 Itah Ct \pp.
1997), is instructive. In Lucas, this Court held tl iat a con n nission's
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"dishonesty" finding was unsupported by substantial evidence, because that
evidence was inconsistent and compromised by procedural flaws. This
Court's review of that evidence was detailed, and included review of an
underlying internal affairs (LA.) investigation, consistent with reduced
deference when constitutional rights are at stake. See id.
The Commission's findings in this case are similarly flawed, and
therefore are not substantially supported. With respect to material facts
(Findings \ 1-2, R. 33, in Br. of Appellant Appendix 2), the facts of
Boston's conduct are agreed. However, as argued in Officer Boston's
opening brief, those facts do not establish violations of the cited policies,
because the policies themselves do not adequately proscribe her handling of
the collision and theft incidents for which she was terminated. (Br. of
Appellant pp. 15-17, 18-20.) The City, in its brief to this Court, offers no
response to those arguments. Instead, the City offers its repetitive mixture
of facts, opinions, and desired conclusions, independent from the
purportedly violated policies.
A, "Use of Discretion" Policy Gave Inadequate Notice,
That stance erodes the City's position on appeal because, as explained
in Officer Boston's opening brief (Br. of Appellant p. 15-16), the
Department's "Use of Discretion" policy, allegedly violated in the collision
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incident, does not mandate aggressive DUI investigations. If an "aggressive
DUI investigation" policy existed, and if it were applied to Officer Boston's
handling of the collision incident, this would be a different case. But the
"Use of Discretion" policy, which reminds officers that less-intrusive
measures are often preferable to arrest, cannot be stretched to encompass an
"aggressive DUI investigation" mandate. Therefore, the "Use of Discretion"
policy did not provide constitutionally adequate notice that Officer Boston,
by not more aggressively investigating the collision subject, would be
committing misconduct.
That due process "notice" problem was compounded by the
Commission's failure to recognize, and address, the conflict between Officer
Boston's description of the suspect driver (Br. of Appellant p. 9, R. 31 p.
273-275), and the description given by Chief Burbank (R. 31 p. 104.)
Burbank, who did not himself observe the suspect, adopted the description
given by Officer Stutz (Br. of Appellant p. 9, SLC 269, 274-275), who did
not appear at the Commission hearing. At that hearing, Burbank testified,
"There was an assisting officer with [Officer Boston] at that time that
described this individual as certainly intoxicated." (R. 31 p. 104.) That was
an obvious reference to Stutz.
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An analysis whether discretion has been misused under the "Use of
Discretion" policy necessarily depends upon the circumstances wherein
discretion is exercised. If the collision incident suspect was "certainly
intoxicated/' as alleged by Burbank in reliance upon Stutz, it would be more
likely that Officer Boston misused her discretion under the policy. But if the
suspect's condition appeared less impaired, as testified by Officer Boston
(Br. of Appellant p. 9, citing R. 31 p. 273-275), the policy violation finding
is less likely to be legitimate.
The City asserts that the Commission "was in the best position to
consider all the testimony presented" regarding the collision incident. It
continues that "Officer Boston's and Officer Stutz's observations were
simply two pieces of evidence that were before the [Commission]." (Br. of
Appellee p. 25.) As just explained, those were two pieces of highly
consequential evidence, bearing on the question whether Boston violated the
"Use of Discretion" policy. The Commission was inadequately positioned
to weigh Stutz's observations against those of Boston, because Stutz did not
testify to the Commission. Instead, Stutz's observations were endorsed by
Chief Burbank, who adopted them as "fact." That is another reason why the
Commission's decision cannot stand: the Commission failed to

14

acknowledge, or resolve, the conflicting versions of the collision incident
given by officers Boston and Stutz. (Br. of Appellant p. 17-18.)
B. "Report" Policies Gave Inadequate Notice.
The City's broad criticism of Officer Boston's handling of the theft
incident also does not answer Boston's argument on appeal. Boston argues
that the "report" policy that she allegedly violated was vaguely-written and
unevenly observed. (Br. of Appellant p. 18-20.) In response, the City
snipes: "Although Officer Boston's counsel could have cross-examined
Chief Burbank on this very issue at the [Commission] hearing, he did not,
instead bringing up this idea for the first time in this appeal." (Br. of
Appellee p. 26 n.6.)
That is not true. Boston's counsel cross examined Chief Burbank on
this very issue, with reference to the LA. file. (R. 31 p. 167-176.) Burbank
ultimately conceded that other officers had been using log reports instead of
general offense reports:
What the officers have done, and what Stephanie did in this
particular case, is at the conclusion of her dealing with this
individual she advised the dispatcher or entered that this is
going to be just cleared with that one-page log report, 'And this
is the notation that I want added to it,' which is that little bit of
information.
(R.31p. 176.)
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Burbank's concession was confirmed by Sergeant Hill. After hearing
Boston's account of the theft incident (R. 31 p. 210-211), Hill reviewed
Department report-writing policies and practice. He discovered an
inconsistency about using log reports versus general offense reports under
the extant policies. (R. 31 p. 209-215.) Hill related:
So I took it upon myself to do just an informal survey of my
officers on my shift. And I asked them how many were actually
doing or would have done a log report under a set of
circumstances, being very minor. Of course we wouldn't do it on
a traffic accident or death or something like that, but on
something very minor. And about 50 to 60 percent of the officers
that I had on the shift, four or five of them, said that they would
have done a log report. That surprised me.
So I then made contact with Sgt. Ferrin, who does things like car
prowls, which basically is what we're talking about, the theft of
these tools. And he indicated that even though some of these
were done that way, he really wasn't in favor of that.
(R. 31 pp. 211, 212.) Sergeant Hill had also discussed such uneven
observation and interpretation of "report" rules with his captain: "And the
question came up with the officers: If dispatch and records are able to do log
reports, why can't the officers?" (R. 31 p. 214.)
Between Chief Burbank's concession and Sergeant Hill's inquiry, it
seems clear that by generating a log report instead of a general offense report
about the theft incident, Officer Boston was acting in accord with a rather
common officer practice. Because the "report" policies did not specifically
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forbid that practice, discipline and termination of Officer Boston, under
those policies, violated due process notice principles. Accordingly, such
discipline and termination were not supported by substantial evidence. Put
another way, Chief Burbank abused his discretion by imposing discipline
and termination, and the Commission abused its discretion by upholding
Chief Burbank's decision.
REPLY POINT III:
NONEXISTENT "SUPPORT FOR DISCIPLINE" ARGUMENT;
NON-SUPPORTABLE "PROPORTIONALITY"
AND "CONSISTENCY" DETERMINATIONS
The City correctly recites the two main elements of public employee
discipline review: (1) Whether the facts support any discipline, i.e., whether
misconduct occurred; and (2) whether the misconduct, if it did occur,
justified termination. (Br. of Appellee p. 28.) The City established neither
such element before the Commission. Nor can such elements be deemed
satisfied on appeal.
A. No Justification for Any Discipline.
Officer Boston has argued that neither element is satisfied in this case.
The City articulates no response to Boston's arguments regarding the first
element—whether any discipline was justified. (Br. of Appellant p. 15-20.)
Instead, the City broadly relies upon its "evidence marshaling" mantra.
17

Whether such reliance is intended to encompass an argument about
whether the facts supported discipline is by no means clear. What should be
clear, as explained in Reply Points I and II, is that the City's evidencemarshaling argument cannot carry the day, and that the record evidence and
facts of this case do not support affirmance of the Commission's decision as
to whether any discipline was justified. If this Court agrees with Boston on
these arguments, then it should reverse the Commission's ruling without
further analysis.4
B. Unsupportable "Proportionality" Conclusions.
Even if discipline were appropriate, the second, "justification of
termination" element is not satisfied in this case. That element contains subelements of "proportionality" and "consistency." (Br. of Appellant p. 14-15;
Br. of Appellee pp. 29, 35.) The City's "proportionality" argument, like that
of Boston, addresses the factors enunciated in Ogden City Corp. v. Harmon,
2007 UT App 274, 116 P.3d 682. (Br. of Appellee p. 30-35; Br. of
Appellant p. 22-25.) Because the City's analysis is conclusory, this Court
should reject it.

4

The evidence marshaling requirement is effectively codified at Utah R. App. P.
24(a)(9). Experience may prove that requirement to be counter-productive,
because it can cause appellate advocacy to devolve into attacks upon brief writing
skills, rather than a focus on substantive issues.
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Ability to Perform Duties
It is true that Boston's alleged 2006 and 2007 transgressions occurred
while she was on-duty as a police officer. (Br. of Appellee p. 30.) But the
City misfires in its effort to demonstrate that Officer Boston's conduct
"impeded her ability for perform her duties .. .." (Br. of Appellee p. 30-31.)
The City characterizes the collision incident and the theft incident as "very
serious," based upon Chief Burbank's opinion. (Id. p. 31.) While the City
offers no definition of "very serious;" Utah statutes offer guidance. A DUI,
suspected in the collision incident, is normally a class B misdemeanor under
Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6a-502 & -503 (West 2008). As for the theft
incident, the alleged value of the stolen tools was under $1,000.00, making
that offense either a class B or class A misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann.
§§ 76-6-404 & -412(1) (West 2008). Three felony levels, and capital
offenses, are all more serious than class A and B misdemeanors. Therefore,
labeling the alleged mishandling of suspected class A and B offenses as
"very serious" is both conclusory and exaggerated.
The City again invokes repetition over reason by citing "a chance"
that Boston might "mishandle" some other cases, and by claiming that
Officer Boston's alleged misconduct represented "recurring" poor
performance and a "pattern of inability to perform" to Department standards.
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(Br. of Appellee p. 31fflfb, c, d.) What the City has demonstrated,
objectively, is that Boston, during her ten-year career, has been cited for five
errors. It is an extreme exaggeration to describe those errors, established
and otherwise, as constituting a "pattern." Boston was "an excellent officer
in many performance areas," whose "employee evaluations were universally
excellent." (R. 33, in Br. of Appellant Appendix 2.) Balanced against that
record, Boston's five asserted errors do not bespeak an inability to perform
her duties. See Harmon, 2005 UT App 274 1f 18, 116 P.3d at 978 (exemplary
record can trump tenuous evidence of misconduct).
Public Confidence in Department
The record indicates that the theft complainant was unhappy with
Officer Boston's handling of his call, but that he was happy with the way the
Department ultimately handled it. (Br. of Appellant p. 23-24.) It is
therefore a stretch to describe the complainant as a "very unhappy citizen."
(Br. of Appellee p. 32.) Furthermore, no record evidence suggests that the
complainant was unhappy because Officer Boston did not write a general
offense report—the transgression alleged by the Department. He was
unhappy because Officer Boston had not immediately recovered his
property.
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Had the complainant's case been left unresolved, Officer Boston's
response could have undermined confidence in the Department. But the
ultimate resolution of the call proceeded as Officer Boston had envisioned,
with the recovery of most or all of the complainant's property. (Br. of
Appellant p. 11.) Boston's handling of the theft complaint began a
systematic response that proved successful. It is, therefore, not reasonable
and rational to claim that she erred in a way that would erode public
confidence in the Department.
Morale and Effectiveness
The City argues that Officer Boston's alleged mishandling of the
collision and theft incidents "could" affect Department morale. (Br. of
Appellee p. 33.) As previously explained, those incidents were not
mishandled in light of the actual written policies that Boston was accused of
violating. Even if they were mishandled, the "morale" factor does not ask
whether morale "could" be affected; it asks whether the conduct did
undermine morale and effectiveness. Harmon, 2005 UT App 274 f 18, 116
P.3d at 978.
The City relies on collateral evidence to the effect that some other
officers were unhappy working with Boston in general, and Sergeant Hill
had expressed concern about "shortcuts" she allegedly took. (Br. of
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Appellee p. 33-34.) But such evidence, as presented to the Commission,
was not tied to the particular alleged transgressions. It therefore cannot be
said that those transgressions, in and of themselves, affected Department
morale and effectiveness. Compare Fisher v. Salt Lake City Civil Service
Comm Jn, 28 Utah 2d 172, 176, 499 P.2d 854, 856 (1972) (open
insubordination, including publication of embarrassing allegations, utend[ed]
to undermine the morale of the firemen and the good order of the
department.").
If anything in this situation "could" undermine morale and
effectiveness, it would be the way in which Officer Boston" s termination
came about. After Ihree disciplinary actions in 2005, Boston received no
performance evaluations that even mentioned those actions. Instead, she
received plaudits for exemplary job performance. When a performance
evaluation was done, over a year after the last 2005 discipline, it was again
highly favorable. (Br. of Appellant p. 8.) Under such circumstances,
Boston's termination, not her conduct, was more likely to erode her fellow
officers' morale.
Non-willful, Inadvertent Error
The City properly acknowledges the Commission's finding that
Officer Boston did not willfully violate policy. However, the City goes on
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to allege that Boston had "developed a consistent pattern of neglect of duty,
not servicing the public." (Br. of Appellee p. 34, quoting Burbank
testimony.) That allegation cannot be reconciled with Boston's ten years of
service, consistently "excellent" performance evaluations, and citations for
exemplary performance. (R. 33, in Br. of Appellant Appendix 2; Br. of
Appellant Appendices 3-4.) Five non-willful errors, during that time, do not
establish a "pattern" of unacceptable conduct.
Likelihood of Recurrence
The City recites Chief Burbank's opinion regarding the final
consideration, whether Officer Boston's alleged misconduct was likely to
reoccur, under Harmon, \ 18, 116 P.3d at 978. (Br. of Appellee p. 35.) To
support that opinion, the City re-hashes previous arguments about the
seriousness of Boston's alleged errors. To that repetition, the City appends
Chief Burbank's opinion that Boston had been counseled to change her
behavior but had not done so. Five errors, in relatively low-stakes matters,
over nearly ten years, hardly justifies such opinion. As a matter of
reasonableness and rationality, the "likely to reoccur" conclusion urged by
the City, like the other Harmon factors, does not withstand review.
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C. Unsupportable "Consistency" Conclusions.
The City's attempt to support the Commission's "consistency"
determination also fails. Most crucially, the City misapprehends this Court's
explanation of "consistency" review. The City claims that the burden of
proving inconsistent treatment remained at all times on Officer Boston. (Br.
of Appellee p. 36.) That is incorrect. Under Kelly v. Salt Lake City Civil
Service Comm % 2000 UT App 235, 8 P.3d 1048, there was an initial burden
on Boston to make a prima facie case of disparate treatment. If such prima
facie case were made, the burden shifted to the City, to show a "fair and
rational basis for the inconsistency." (Br. of Appellant p. 26, quoting Kelly.)
The Commission's key error, under Kelly, was its failure to consider,
much less determine, whether Officer Boston had introduced sufficient
evidence to make a prima facie case of disparate treatment. Boston herself
reviewed disciplinary records from other officers that the City had produced
in pre-hearing discovery. She compared those records with her situation,
and articulated the differences. (Br. of Appellant p. 27.)5 At that point,
before even weighing Chief Burbank's testimony on the subject, the

5

It therefore does not matter whether those records, themselves, were admitted as
hearing exhibits, as implied by the City. (Br. of Appellee p. 37 n.7.) Boston's
review of those records gave her the foundation to testify as to whether her
treatment was in line with that of similarly-situated officers. (Br. of Appellant p.
26-27.)
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Commission was obliged to decide whether Boston had made a prima facie
case—not a conclusive case—of disparate treatment. Having failed to do that,
the Commission's "consistency" conclusion (R. 34 % 2, in Br. of Appellant
Appendix 2) was premature. Entered without following the prescribed, and
therefore "due" process, the "consistency" conclusion cannot stand on
appeal.
Furthermore, the evidence of consistency "marshaled" by the City is
itself incomplete. (Br. of Appellee p. 37-38.) Another officer, according to
Boston, was terminated for stealing or misappropriating $20.00, along with
"other charges attached to that." (R. 31 p. 302.) Thus it is misleading for
the City to assert that that officer "really had no other complaints in his
history." (Br. of Appellee p. 37.) Another officer is described by the City as
having mishandled a DUI call, and as having "no prior disciplinary history."
(Br. of Appellee p. 38.) But Officer Boston, having reviewed the City's
discovery, related that that officer had two prior nondisciplinary interviews
in a year; he was disciplined with sixty hours unpaid leave and DUI training.
(R. 31 p. 293.) Chief Burbank described an officer who was terminated
(resigned in lieu of termination) for poor documentation and report writing
(Br. of Appellee p. 37-38 \ b-c). It is unclear whether this was the same
officer, described by Officer Boston, as having "21 documented incidents of
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being coached, evaluations that he needed to improve his reports, getting his
reports turned in on time . . .." (R. 31 p. 293.)
Citing a colloquy with one of the commissioners, the City "marshals"
Chief Burbank's understanding that "some fairly good officers and some
outstanding officers" have lost their jobs because of misconduct. (Br. of
Appellee p. 38.) That understanding may or may not be accurate. However,
it is far too broad, and vague, to provide any meaningful data for
"consistency" analysis under Kelly. As such, the Chiefs understanding is
nothing more than anecdotal, and irrelevant.
The City assails Officer Boston for pointing out differences between
her history and that of T.S., another terminated officer. According to the
City, "Officer Boston never mentioned this case during the [Commission]
hearing and her counsel never questioned Chief Burbank about it. ..." (Br.
of Appellee p. 39.) That assertion is also misleading. Based upon the
discovery provided by the City, Boston's counsel argued the differences
between T.S. and Officer Boston in closing argument to the Commission.
(R. 31 p. 337-338.) That argument was heard without objection. So, too,
was counsel permitted to distinguish, without objection, the differing
behavior of Officer Greer, also argued in Officer Boston's brief. (R. 31 p.
337; Br. of Appellant p. 28-29.)
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Finally, the City misapplies the review standard for imposing
discipline of any kind, which is "abuse of discretion," to "consistency"
review. (Br. of Appellee p. 40.) The principle that the Chief "is in the best
position to know" whether officer conduct merits discipline does not apply
to "consistency" analysis. "Consistency" analysis, as just explained, entails
a process of evidence presentation and burden shifting. That process was
not followed in this case.
Thus the evidence that the City "marshals" is really incomplete,
unclear, or irrelevant. The City asks this Court to ignore evidence, supplied
in its own discovery and argued to the Commission, that "similarly" treated
officers had, in fact, dissimilar transgressions and histories. That approach
to the evidence cannot be relied upon to uphold the Commission's
"consistency" conclusion. That conclusion, as already explained, is even
more fundamentally undermined by the Commission's failure to address
whether a prima facie showing of inconsistent treatment had been made.
That conclusion, therefore, ought to be rejected by this Court.
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REPLY POINT IV
ISSUE PRESERVATION
This Court should reject the City's apparent suggestion, unsupported
by actual argument, that Officer Boston's appellate arguments are not
preserved for appeal At various points in its brief, usually in footnotes, the
City indirectly accuses Boston of not raising certain arguments before the
Commission. (Br. of Appellee pp. 19-20, 24 n.5, 26. n.6, 37 n.7, 40 n.8.)
The City stops short of asserting that such arguments are not preserved for
appeal Compare Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98 % 9, 17 P.3d 1122, 1124
(appellee argued non-preservation, and appellate court agreed).
Whether or not the City thereby intends to waive a "default" or "nonpreservation" argument on appeal, it certainly has not squarely presented
one. Nevertheless, Officer Boston pauses here, in closing, to clarify her
position: Various of the Commission's findings and conclusions are either
clearly erroneous, an abuse of discretion, or founded upon errors of law.
Those errors arose within the Commission's effort to decide the two overarching review elements of public employment termination: (1) whether
Boston's conduct justified discipline; and (2) whether termination was the
appropriate sanction. At her Commission hearing and on appeal, Officer
Boston has argued that neither such determination could properly be made.
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Furthermore, it should be recognized that the Commission is a
specialized tribunal, dealing virtually exclusively with public employee
suspensions and terminations. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012 (West
2008) (enumerating civil service commission duties). Case law explicating
the procedures to be followed in that role is not so extensive as to be beyond
the Commission's expected awareness or comprehension, as might happen
were such a proceeding brought before a generalized tribunal, such as a trial
court. Therefore, the Commission should be charged with a duty to know
and apply that law. That did not happen in this case, and the risk of such
failure properly rests with the Commission. It should not rest with Boston,
whose reputation has been damaged by the fundamentally flawed
termination proceedings.
CONCLUSION
As set forth in Officer Boston's opening brief and in this reply brief,
the process by which she was terminated, and by which the Commission
ratified her termination, was deeply and fundamentally flawed. Critical
Commission findings are either clearly erroneous, or are unsupported
conclusions, or are founded upon legal error. Accordingly, the
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Commission's decision upholding Boston's termination should be reversed.
This Court should order that Officer Boston be reinstated, with back pay.
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